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Abstract:  I examine the impact of the design of the Irish public pension programme on two
dimensions of Ireland’s macroeconomic performance: employment and the average saving rate.
Two facets of the programme might affect these outcomes: the lack of generosity of the programme
relative to other OECD countries, and the high degree of redistribution embedded in the
programme. These characteristics suggest that the programme has little ‘crowding out’ effect on
saving rates. For employment rates, the two facets have contradictory effects that ultimately
cancel out in their aggregate effect. These findings are illustrated by using a cross-country
analysis to simulate a counterfactual where Ireland instead had a pension programme with the
average characteristics of OECD countries (i.e., both more generous and less redistributive). 
I INTRODUCTION: MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND 
LABOUR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
T
he performance of the Irish economy in the last twenty years has
precipitated much international interest. Brendan Walsh is one of a small
group of economists that attempted to explain this transformation in Irish
fortunes after the relatively poor performance of its economy in the 1980s.
Many economists, including Brendan, use the insights of trade theory and
open economy macroeconomics to explain this phenomenon. However, it is the
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on macroeconomic outcomes, which form the basis of this essay.  Brendan
Walsh, too, has studied this interaction in the Irish context and his insights
have some bearing on the present study (Walsh, 2004). The focus here is on a
specific labour market ‘institution’: the mode of pension provision, and how
this affects macroeconomic outcomes.1
Several papers by leading macroeconomists have examined the role of
labour market institutions, and labour market reforms, in ‘explaining’
differences in economic performance across OECD countries over time,
especially differential trends in unemployment/inactivity and employment.2
At the centrepiece of much of the literature is the issue of how the ‘tax wedge’
– the sum of taxes levied on households including contributions to public
pension programmes – has potentially adverse effects on employment (Nickell,
2004). Many of the recommendations implicit in this literature found a lucid
exposition in the OECD “Jobs Study” (OECD, 1995). This report argued that
measures to ‘free up’ the labour market, including lower labour taxes, greater
measures to increase labour market flexibility and to give greater emphasis to
‘in-work’ rather than out-of-work benefits, should be encouraged in order to
boost employment and reduce inactivity.3 As such, the OECD report and
related studies have sometimes been seen as championing the ‘Anglo-Saxon
model’ of low labour taxes, and liberalised labour markets (low unionisation
and low regulation) against the ‘continental European’ model of high labour
taxes, regulation and ‘solidaristic’ negotiation of wages and conditions
including generous social welfare programmes and, especially, generous public
provision of pensions.
This dichotomy between ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘solidaristic’ labour markets is
of course a crude demarcation; a cap which fails to fit for many of the
constituent countries. Indeed, one of the interesting features of the recent
Irish experience is how it does not appear to fit this stylised demarcation, and
nor do its recent policies square completely with the implicit recommendations
of the OECD ‘model’. As Honohan and Walsh note in their influential
Brookings paper on the ‘Irish Hare’:
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1Brendan Walsh has also had an interest and involvement in Irish pension provision, primarily
through being a trustee in a large private pension fund and his influence on pension policy;
nevertheless to my knowledge his recent published research has focused on other labour market
institutions and policies. 
2Representative recent papers include Blau and Kahn (1999); Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2003);
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Nickell (1997); Nickell and Layard (1999) and Nickell, Nunziata
and Ochel (2005). 
3For an analysis and interpretation of the implementation of policies arising from the “Jobs
Study” and related reports, see Banks et al. (2005). [The employment] miracle owes something to a more co-operative
approach among the social partners – labor, management and government
– than has been achieved at any time in the past… Some reduction in
disincentives to employment arising from the social welfare and tax
systems, and an increased emphasis on active labor market measures,
helped the labor market to function more smoothly, but these measures
were secondary. (2002, pp. 38-39.)
What is striking about this quote is that it describes an essentially
co-operative solution to a below-par economic performance in a predominantly
‘Anglo-Saxon’ environment. That is, countries such as the UK and the US
changed their economies in this period by applying a deregulated and market-
oriented model of economic transformation with little involvement of ‘social
partners’ in the process.4 But, despite similar falls in unionism to the UK and
US, Ireland did not fully adopt the same solution. True, countries that have
operated in a consistently corporatist fashion, with full involvement of social
partners, have also had relatively successful economies for long periods during
the last fifty years. However, the price of social co-operation in those countries,
such as the Scandinavian bloc, has generally been substantial programmes of
social welfare expenditure, notably in the fields of provision for retired and
disabled people, which have proved extremely hard to finance in periods of
economic downturn and also in the context of demographic ageing of the
population.  
In contrast, the Irish transformation seems to have occurred, according to
Honohan and Walsh, by means of social partnership but without the
concomitant rise in social welfare expenditures that has been part of the
‘settlement’ between social partners in other countries. This facet of the Irish
social welfare programme can be most clearly illustrated by the generosity of
its public pension programme relative to other OECD countries. The net
replacement ratio of the Irish public pension system, relative to average
earnings, is only 36.6 per cent, the lowest of any OECD country, below New
Zealand (39.5 per cent), Korea (44.3 per cent) and Mexico (45.1 per cent)
(OECD, 2005). Since the Irish programme provides a flat benefit, this average
might conceal a good deal of generosity at the bottom end of the income
distribution. But even at 50 per cent of average earnings, the pension
replacement rate in Ireland is only 63.0 per cent, with only 5 countries
(including the more affluent Germany and US) having lower ratios (OECD,
ibid).  
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4For an evaluation of the UK experience, see Blundell, Card and Freeman (2004).Not surprisingly, too, given Ireland’s relatively youthful population,
effective contribution rates to social welfare programmes in Ireland are among
the lowest among OECD countries: Disney (2004) estimates that the pay-as-
you-go equilibrium contribution rate in Ireland was 15.2 per cent of the
earnings bill in 1995, exceeding only Australia (14.7 per cent) and compared to
an average among the 23 countries analysed of 28.0 per cent. (However, as I
shall show later in this essay, this low cost of public pension spending in
Ireland arises primarily from the lack of programme generosity rather than
demographic factors.) Overall, perhaps this unique combination of an ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ welfare state with a European-style ‘social partnership’ plays a part in
explaining the Irish ‘economic miracle’. Whether such a combination can be
sustained as expectations rise and social partners expect rewards for their co-
operation remains an important policy question for Ireland in the future.
Given this context, the present paper explores the implications of having
a low cost and essentially redistributive public pension programme, such as
exists in Ireland, for several dimensions of economic activity – particularly for
labour force participation rates across the population and for household saving
rates. Using the parameters from a cross-country panel-data analysis (Disney,
2004, 2005), I then attempt to estimate the impact of the design of the public
pension programme on macroeconomic performance in Ireland. I do this by
simulating an experiment – what would have been the impact on the Irish
economy if it were to have adopted a public pension programme that was
closer to the OECD ‘average’ including other, more ‘corporatist’ economies,
such as Scandinavian countries and the Bismarckian programmes of
continental Europe? This ‘experiment’ can either be seen as a pure counter-
factual – that is, a by-product of the Irish persisting with an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or
‘Beveridge’model of social security. Or else it can be seen as a possible outcome
were there to be pressure from social partners to increase deferred
compensation (public pensions) as a quid pro quo of greater prosperity and
social co-operation. Finally, such reforms are contrasted with actual trends
and current reforms in the Irish pension programme, with a possible diagnosis
as to where these may lead.
II PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMMES AND EMPLOYMENT
At the heart of much of the analysis of macroeconomic performance in
OECD countries is the average ‘tax wedge’ on households. The measured ‘tax
wedge’ on households is derived by adding together direct taxes, sometimes
consumption taxes and (always) contributions to public pension (social
security) programmes, as a percentage of the wage bill.
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from variations in the design of the social security programme. Programme
design ranges from the ‘floor-based’ system (normally called a ‘Beveridge’
programme) that relies heavily on targeted benefits and second pillar private
funded provision, through to a comprehensive public programme of earnings-
replacement in retirement (normally called the ‘Bismarck’ system) with little
or no private provision of pensions. ‘Bismarck’ programmes normally levy
higher notional contribution rates than ‘Beveridge’ systems.5
Taxes imposed on labour, such as contributions to social welfare
programmes, drive a wedge between the cost of labour to the employer and the
post-tax wage received by employees. As such, there are various mechanisms
by which the tax wedge may reduce aggregate employment. In a static setting,
if employees bear the incidence of the ‘tax wedge’, then a higher tax wedge
shifts incentives in favour of leisure, non-market activities or the ‘informal’
sector, relative to paid work in the formal sector. The same impact arises from
a different direction if employers bear some or all of the incidence of the tax
wedge as a result of product or labour market imperfections, such as the
activities of trade unions, whereby the demand for labour is reduced. In a
dynamic setting of wage bargaining, higher labour taxes may induce workers
to bid for a higher target real wage and/or induce employers to resist real wage
increases with greater vigour. The result is a higher level of equilibrium
unemployment (as in Jackman, Layard and Nickell, 1991). 
In practice, the impact of the ‘tax wedge’ on employment is mediated
through labour market institutions. In countries with weak labour unions and
low out-of-work benefits, the incentives and capacity of workers to withdraw
from the labour market are rather low. In contrast, where employer-worker
bargains are centrally co-ordinated, the employment effects are also
potentially weaker since the employment effects can be ‘internalised’ through
contract setting. The ‘tax wedge’ is likely to have the largest effect either
where employers are strongly unionised and bargaining is not co-ordinated or
where out-of-work benefits are generous, whether in level or duration. So,
following a well-established macroeconomic literature, several authorities,
such as Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000), argue that
the appropriate labour market institutions for minimising the adverse impact
of tax levels on employment are either a fully deregulated model or a full
corporatist environment involving all social partners. Economies with ‘mixed’
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5Note that ‘Bismarck’ programmes have also tended to have redistributive features, such as
minimum pensions and differential retirement ages for different groups in the labour force (such
as private and public sector workers), but do not exhibit systematic redistribution by flat benefits
or substantial means-tested components within the programme. models e.g. bilateral negotiation with strong trades unions, are much less
successful in averting the impact of higher labour taxes on the level of
unemployment. Ireland has benefited in recent years by having a low level of
the ‘tax wedge’ relatively to almost all her competitors among OECD
countries.6
Whilst there has been some discussion of whether, for example,
consumption taxes should be included in the ‘tax wedge’, there has been little
or no discussion in the macroeconomic literature as to whether payroll taxes,
which largely comprise contributions to the social insurance programme (and
which in turn largely comprise contributions towards public pensions), should
automatically be included in the ‘tax wedge’.  As I have argued at length
elsewhere (Disney, 2004), the assumption that contributions to a pay-as-you-
go public pension programme are a ‘tax’ is equivalent to assuming that
participants in the programme expect to get nothing back from their
contributions in the future, even though most social insurance programmes
are motivated by concepts such as ‘intergenerational equity (or ‘solidarity’)’
and quasi-actuarial notions of participants earning ‘rights’ or ‘points’ towards
future pension entitlements (as in France and Germany). Moreover, there is
evidence from surveys that people expect to get something back from their
contributions in the future even if it is not exactly what they put in to the
programme (Dominitz, Manski and Heinz, 2003). Therefore, in my view,
including public pension contributions wholly in the ‘tax wedge’ is erroneous –
the question is the extent to which (or under what circumstances)
contributions should be treated wholly as a ‘tax’ on labour.
This can be illustrated by the case of Ireland. The Irish public pension
programme is highly redistributive (intragenerationally) in the sense that
contributions are (broadly) earnings-related whereas pensions are flat
benefits, or means tested. For many contributors, therefore, contributions are
essentially a pure tax insofar as benefits ultimately received bear little
relationship to contributions paid. As suggested previously, we can contrast
Ireland, and other broadly ‘Beveridge’ countries with ‘Bismarck’ systems,
where pensions are broadly proportional to contributions, and to ‘notional
account’ programmes, such as that in Sweden, where individuals have
unfunded individual accounts with the government that accrue notional
benefits (with a rate of return determined by economic parameters such as
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6According to the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance, total taxes on labour in Ireland,
defined as payroll taxes (social insurance contributions) plus income and consumption taxes, rose
from 23 per cent of payroll in 1960-1964 to a peak of 41 per cent in 1988-1995, falling to 33 per
cent by 1996-2000. Contrast this trend with France (55 per cent, 67 per cent and 68 per cent
respectively) and even the United Kingdom (34 per cent, 47 per cent and 44 per cent) and the
United States (34 per cent, 45 per cent and 45 per cent).GDP growth) – for further explanation and discussion, see Disney (2000a).
Because of the redistribution inherent in the ‘Beveridge’ system, contributions
to such programmes have a higher ‘tax component’ than contributions in a
‘Bismarck’ regime because prospective benefits are more closely tied to
individual contributions in the latter.  Of course, the absolute contribution
rate is likely to be lower in Beveridge regimes than in countries operating
according to the Bismarck system of pension provision because benefit
payments are more explicitly redistributive. 
The other issue in the treatment of pension contributions that has
relevance to Ireland is the treatment of contributions to funded versus
unfunded pension programmes. In the traditional ‘tax wedge’ literature,
contributions to public pension programmes are treated as a ‘tax’ whereas
contributions to a mandatory second pillar programme, such as
‘superannuation’ in Australia or funded schemes in the Netherlands and
Switzerland, are treated as ‘saving’.7 In some countries (such as Australia and
New Zealand), no separate public pension contributions are levied on payroll
at all. Moreover, there is no differentiation in the literature on the tax wedge
between contributions paid to finance current beneficiaries (pure ‘pay-as-you-
go’ finance) and contributions paid into a social security Trust Fund over and
above current outgoings, even if these contributions are invested in private
markets. This has pertinence for the interpretation of the National Pension
Reserve Fund in Ireland created in 2002, the value of which currently exceeds
10 billion euros. 
To summarise, the existing literature has argued that the adverse effects
of the overall ‘tax wedge’ depend on the nature of labour market institutions –
especially out-of-work benefits, the extent of unionisation and the degree of
centralised bargaining and co-ordination. In the conventional analysis, the low
total value of the tax wedge plus declining unionism, low real benefit levels
and some degree of ‘social partnership’ – have all contributed to the better-
than-average Irish performance in the 1980s and 1990s. 
I have suggested here that we should also consider institutional design
features when it comes to how we treat contributions to public pension
programmes as part of the ‘tax wedge’. The closeness of the link between
individual contributions and individual pensions (sometimes called ‘actuarial’
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7At the risk of further complication, private ‘defined contribution’ retirement saving programmes
broadly pay out benefits in proportion to the accumulated fund of contributions plus interest
whereas ‘defined benefit’ plans (such as company-provided ‘final salary’ schemes) may also
redistribute contributions e.g., from short-tenured participants to long-tenured participants – for
evidence, see Disney and Whitehouse (1996). Moreover, mandatory saving programmes, whether
funded or unfunded, may have effects on household behaviour where households face liquidity
constraints. fairness) varies according to different public pension regimes. The closer the
link, the lower the ‘tax component’ of the public pension (social security)
contribution and the less (ceteris paribus) the adverse impact of this
component of the measured ‘tax wedge’ on employment.  In Ireland, there is
little link between contributions and benefits, since the programme broadly
provides flat or means-tested benefits financed by contributions proportional
to earnings. So the Irish programme has a low contribution rate (relative to
OECD) but a relatively high ‘tax component’ to the public programme. By
assumption, however, the second tier provision of retirement benefits through
private retirement saving is broadly ‘actuarially fair’, so this conclusion
cannot be generalised by the pension programme as a whole encompassing
both public and private pensions.  
2.1 Measuring the Tax Component of the Public Pension Programme
How can we measure the ‘tax component’ of a public pension programme
in practice? There are two dimensions to this tax component. The first is an
intergenerational dimension. As Sinn (2000) and Lindbeck and Persson
(2003), among many others, have noted, in a dynamically efficient economy
the average return on a funded pension programme should exceed the feasible
implicit return on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financed programme, since the
maximum sustainable average long-run return on contributions in the latter
is given by the growth of the labour force in effective units (allowing for
technological change). The difference between the two is an ‘implicit tax’ from
utilising PAYG financing rather than a fully-funded programme. If we assume
that a funded programme is invested in an international portfolio, and allow
for differences in average returns to contributions to a PAYG-financed system
across cohorts, then an approximate measure of this intergenerational
‘implicit tax’ is that it is (negatively) related to the average internal rate of
return on a cohort’s contributions to the PAYG programme – the lower the
return on those contributions, the higher the implicit tax rate.
The second is an intragenerational element to the measure of the ‘tax
component’. Within each generation, the return on contributions to a public
pension programme also depends on design features – for example, whether
couples are treated identically as single-person households, whether
households over the lifetime receive benefits proportional to their
contributions or whether, say, richer households receive a lower implicit
return on their contributions than poorer households. To the extent that
replacement rates from the programme vary over households in a given
cohort, there is as an additional tax component on the less well-treated
households over and above any implicit tax arising from choosing PAYG
financing rather than full-funding. This is particularly pertinent for the
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– since saving is disproportionately undertaken by better-off households, who
are, therefore, likely to face lower returns on their contributions to a public
programme which embodies highly redistributive design features. 
III PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMMES AND HOUSEHOLD SAVING
The existence of a public pension (social security) programme also has
another – macroeconomic impact – on the saving and consumption behaviour
of households. There is an extensive literature that argues that contributions
to public pension programmes substitute for private retirement saving. In a
seminal paper, which has spawned a large literature, Feldstein (1974)
estimated a time series model of consumption spending for the United States
regressed on income, social security wealth (SSW; both gross and net of
contributions) and other household wealth for the US economy 1929-71. From
it, he calculated that total private household saving was approximately halved
by social security wealth. Feldstein (1980) argued that cross-country
differences in saving rates could also be explained by the differing generosity
of the social security programme. Many other studies, using time series, cross-
country and household data have since argued that contributions to public
pension programmes offset private retirement saving, with the ‘offset’
coefficient typically varying between 0 and 1, although it can lie outside these
boundaries in both directions.8
Implicit in this literature is an assumption about public pensions that is
almost the opposite to that of the literature on the ‘tax wedge’. Here, the
‘default’ assumption is not that contributions to public pension programmes
are a pure tax, but rather that they are retirement saving. True, there are
some  caveats to this interpretation of public pension contributions in the
literature and we would not expect one-for-one ‘offset’: some private saving
may not be for retirement (e.g., for buffer stock or precautionary motives) and
so measured offset coefficients may be lower; second, mandatory saving 
(i.e., contributions to the public programme) may exceed that which the
individual would have done in the absence of the public programme so that
lifetime consumption as well as saving may be affected; and third, there are
various issues concerning the correct measurement and interpretation of
private saving. But the existing literature has generally used only aggregate
indicators of the size of the public pension programme (such as contribution
rates, the present value of contributions and/or benefits, average replacement
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8For selective surveys of the literature, see Disney (2000b, 2005).rates, etc.) as indicators when measuring the extent of the offset of 
private retirement saving arising from the existence of a public pension
programme. 
In Disney (2005) I argue, consistently with the previous section, that the
degree of offset of private retirement saving by the public pension programme
also depends on the design of the programme. The greater the ‘tax component’
of the programme, as defined previously, the less the substitutability of public
pension contributions for private retirement saving. So, ceteris paribus, the
more the public programme has ‘Beveridge’ features (and, therefore, from the
previous analysis, the greater the tax component), the less the substitutability
of programme contributions for private saving. In contrast, the closer the link
between contributions and prospective pension benefits in the programme, the
more substitutable are programme contributions for private retirement saving
and the greater the measured ‘offset’. 
The reasoning behind this conclusion is simple. In a country such as
Ireland, public pension contributions earn a low ‘return’ to the average
contributor given the flat benefit and broadly proportional contributions to the
programme. Although this implies that low earners get an implicit ‘high’
return on their contributions, which might induce them to reduce their private
saving, the reverse is true for high earners, who earn a low ‘return’ on their
contributions, and for whom the existence of a public pension programme is a
poor substitute for private retirement saving. Since, as a matter of fact, most
saving is done by middle-to-high income earners, the net effect is that the
existence of a public pension programme should do little to reduce aggregate
saving in the Irish context.9 The reverse is presumably true for countries
where pension benefits are much more closely linked to individual pension
contributions.
The only contrary possibility to this view is the ‘induced retirement’
effect of social security (Feldstein, 1974). If the incentives to retire early
within the programme are large, the shorter working life might require an
increase in the household saving rate. However, since in Ireland there are
limited opportunities to retire early or to receive pensions early through the
public programme (although there may be such effects through company
pension plans, which have greater coverage among high earners), it is unlikely
that the induced retirement effect will reverse the proposition that, in a
Beveridge-style programme, the ‘offset’ of public pensions for private saving is
low.
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9For evidence on differential access to consumer durables by income levels in Ireland, which is a
strong predictor of differences in household saving rates across income classes, see Layte, Nolan
and Whelan (2001). IV EMPIRICAL QUESTIONS
4.1 Measuring the ‘Tax Component’ of the Public Pension Programme in
Ireland
In this section, I provide some empirical measures of the ‘tax component’
of the public pension programme in Ireland, comparing the measures to
average measures for a sample of 23 OECD countries.10 I supplement these
measures with some other important characteristics affecting the size of the
public pension programme. These measures are depicted in Table 1.
Table 1: Pension Programme Indicators: Ireland and OECD Averages 
1975 1985 1995
Ireland
(1) Effective support ratio 2.21 2.37 2.63
(2) Average replacement rate (RR) 28.90% 34.30% 39.70%
(3) Contribution rate = (2)/(1) 13.10% 14.45% 15.20%
(4) C of V of RRs 0.375 0.364 0.368
(5) = (3) × (4) = 'pension tax' 4.90% 5.36% 5.59%
(6) Internal rate of return at 65 –0.30% 0.63% 1.20%
(7) ‘Average’ retirement age 67 years 64 years 62 years
(8) IRR at average retirement age –1.64% 0.14% 0.08%
Average 23 OECD Countries
(1) Effective support ratio 2.47 2.49 2.42
(2) Average replacement rate (RR) 56.70% 61.10% 65.40%
(3) Contribution rate = (2)/(1) 23.92% 25.39% 27.96%
(4) C of V of RRs 0.175 0.161 0.154
(5) = (3) × (4) = 'pension tax' 3.40% 3.19% 3.23%
(6) Internal rate of return at 65 3.34% 2.83% 2.54%
(7) ‘Average’ retirement age 63.1 years 61.5 years 61 years
(8) IRR at average retirement age 4.37% 2.64% 2.36%
The first row in Table 1 is the effective support ratio: the number of
workers per pensioner. I calculate this, with some additional assumptions,
from ILO labour market data. Note that, despite the youthful nature of the
Irish population, and its gradual ageing, the initial support ratio in Ireland is
lower than the average for these OECD countries and has indeed been
increasing whereas the OECD countries’ average is approximately static. The
reason for these disparate trends is simple: Ireland started from a low level of
participation in the formal economy and the growth of employment in Ireland
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10Broadly, the original EU countries until the recent new Accession states, plus Sweden and
Switzerland, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. plus the prolonged boom in births have outweighed the growth in the number
of pensioners. Although old age demographic dependency in Ireland is now
increasing, continued strong employment growth may maintain the support
ratio rather more easily in the future than in other OECD countries, such as
Scandinavia, Japan and NW Europe, where participation rates are already
high.
Row (2) – defined as the average public pension replacement rate on
retirement expected by a person aged 55 years – is derived from data in
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998).11 As mentioned previously, average Irish
replacement rates are among the lowest in OECD countries, but have been
increasing over time (as indeed has the OECD average). Row (3), the average
contribution rate, is simply calculated by exploiting the pay-as-you-go
requirement that the equilibrium contribution rate is equal to the average
replacement rate divided by the support ratio. Note that the contribution rates
derived here are not the same as those used by OECD sources and others,
which are collected from administrative sources and which are often quite
arbitrary (particularly where no separate contribution is levied, or where
public pensions are subsidised out of general tax revenues).  
Row (4), the coefficient of variation of replacement rates, is also derived
from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), who provide various public pension
replacement rates for different household types, delineated by earnings
relative to average earnings and household composition. This provides my
first measure of a design feature of each public pension programme – if the
programme broadly links the pension paid to an individual in an actuarial
manner to that individual’s contributions, the coefficient of variation of
replacement rates by household types will be low. In contrast, in a ‘Beveridge’
programme such as that of Ireland, where replacement rates are higher for
low earners (and indeed for couples relative to singles), the coefficient of
variation will be higher, and this is illustrated in Table 1.
Row (5) simply multiplies the average contribution rate by the coefficient
of variation to obtain a numerical measure of the ‘tax component’ of the
contribution. This variable, denoted the ‘pension tax’, is a proxy for the extent
to which the social security programme embodies intra-(within) generation
actuarial fairness across households in the sense that pension benefits are
proportional to contributions. Although this normalisation is arbitrary, any
normalisation incorporating the average level of contributions and the extent
of the departure from (intragenerational) ‘actuarial fairness’ will produce a
similar ranking of countries. Note that the calculated ‘pension tax’ in Ireland
by this method is somewhat higher than the average for these OECD countries
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11For more recent calculations, see OECD (2005).because, despite lower contribution rates, Ireland departs substantially from
actuarially-based pensions in its public programme.
The remaining rows illustrate the other proxy for a measure of the tax
component arising from public pension programme design discussed in the
previous section – the average internal rate of return (IRR) on contributions
to the public programme by cohort. A higher IRR implies a lower ‘implicit tax’
arising from choosing PAYG financing rather than investment in a funded
programme. Full details of all these calculations are given in Disney (2004)
but it should be noted that the calculation utilises the equilibrium
contribution rate needed to finance current pension outgoings in each
country’s public pension programme derived in row (3). The calculated IRR
does  not therefore depend on the average replacement rate, since this
determines the equilibrium contribution rate – so a low replacement rate does
not of itself generate a low IRR, because contribution rates are also low in such
a circumstance. Instead, the IRR in Table 1 depends on such factors as the
length of the working life and retirement, on the generosity of treatment of
pensioners (and their spouses) and on real earnings growth. Row (6) gives the
IRR for the representative individual if he or she retires at age 65 years. Row
(7) gives actual average retirement ages for each decade, again derived from
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998). Row (8) recalculates the IRRs for these ‘actual’
retirement dates. 
The IRRs in Ireland are low relative to the OECD average (and indeed
negative for people expecting to retire in the 1970s). The reasons for this are
simple. First, the duration of retirement of the average Irish pensioner was
low, especially in the earliest period, relative to the OECD average. As the
retirement period has increased relative to the OECD average, the IRRs have
increased over time. Second, real earnings growth until the 1980s was
relatively low in Ireland compared to other OECD countries. On the other
hand, post-retirement benefits are indexed to earnings in Ireland and spouses
with incomplete work histories are treated better than in pure ‘actuarial’
regimes. So the IRRs have increased slightly whilst the OECD average has
tended to decline over time. But the Irish IRRs are likely to be well below the
real return on capital, indicating a high ‘tax component’ to contributions to the
Irish public pension programme.
To summarise: the conclusions that can be drawn from these indicators of
the design of the Irish public pension programme are simple. The Irish public
pension programme is a low cost programme – one major reason why the Irish
‘tax wedge’, as conventionally measured, is so low. But the ‘tax component’ of
the Irish programme is high for two reasons: the within generation
redistribution to low earners, and the low average return on contributions in
the programme. 
DESIGN OF PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMMES 187I now ask: what are the implications of all this for the macroeconomic
performance of Ireland, relative to the average characteristics of OECD
programmes? On employment (Section II), the higher tax component in
Ireland might be expected to have an adverse impact since contributions to the
programme are essentially a pure tax (mitigated by the low absolute level of
the Irish ‘tax wedge’ and the low replacement rate). In contrast, the higher
relative tax component of the Irish programme reduces the likelihood that the
programme will have an adverse impact on private retirement saving. These
findings can be illustrated by an ‘experiment’ in which we simulate the impact
on Irish labour force participation rates and household saving rates of
redesigning the Irish public pension programme so that it has the features of
an ‘average’ OECD public pension programme. This is done in the next sub-
section.   
4.2 The Irish Public Pension Programme: Simulating Macroeconomic Effects
To  simulate the effect of Ireland’s public pension programme on
macroeconomic variables, I exploit the parameter estimates from a cross-
country panel regression model of the impact of programme design on labour
force participation (economic activity) rates and household saving rates.
Disney (2004) estimated a model of age and gender-specific labour force
participation rates regressed on various design features of the public pension
programme, on country and time dummies, and controls for labour market
institutions and the retirement regime (retirement ‘tests’ and first age of
public pension receipt). I showed that the share of the ‘tax wedge’ in GDP
and/or the average contribution rate, as conventionally measured from OECD
data, have no effect on labour force participation. For several age and gender-
specific groups, higher public pension replacement rates had adverse effects
on participation. For most age groups among women, the higher the IRR on
public pension contributions, the higher the labour force participation. This
accords with my argument that a higher IRR reflects a lower ‘tax component’
to public pension contributions. In similar vein, a higher value of ‘pension tax’
(see row (5) of Table 1) typically reduces labour force participation rates. For
men, however, there is no evidence of the design of the public pension regime
having these predicted effects on labour force participation.
In Disney (2005), I estimate a similar model for household saving rates,
including additional controls for GDP growth and capital market
imperfections. Estimating the standard country-panel version of the standard
model, I find no evidence that higher contribution rates or replacement rates
to the public pension programme reduce household saving; indeed rather the
reverse, although as expected a higher support ratio raises household saving
rates. However, when these variables are replaced by the programme design
188 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWvariables, more plausible results are obtained. In particular, a higher IRR on
programme contributions is strongly associated with a reduction in household
saving, and a higher value of the ‘pension tax’ (indicating a higher ‘tax
component’ and therefore less substitutability for private saving) is associated
with higher household saving.  The reversal of the sign of the results relative
to those for labour force participation strongly supports the theory that
programmes with a higher ‘tax component’ reduce participation but have no
adverse effect on saving, with the opposite finding for more ‘actuarial’ public
programmes. Some representative results for both labour force participation
and household saving rates are described in Table A1.  
Coming to specific results of the simulation, I consider first household
saving. The overall results suggest that average OECD household saving rates
were some 4 percentage points lower in the 1980s and 1990s than the 1970s.
A downward trend in the saving rate is also observed in the measured data for
Ireland (derived from OECD/IMF sources) but in fact the saving rate predicted
by the baseline model (column 5 of Table A1) falls in the 1980s and rises in the
1990s: see Figure 1.
Figure 1: Actual and Predicted Household Saving Rates
I then turn to what happens to the predicted household saving rate when
I replace the public pension programme parameters for Ireland by the OECD
averages from Table 1 (specifically for average replacement rate, ‘pension tax’,
and Internal Rate of Return at 65). The answer is that the Irish saving rate is
0.6 per cent lower in 1975 and slightly higher in the 1980s and 1990s. This
relatively small impact should not be too surprising: as argued in the previous
section, the high ‘tax component’ of the public pension programme in Ireland
mitigates any substitution effect on private retirement saving.











PredictedConsidering labour force participation (economic activity) rates, as
described previously, the empirical evidence suggests that public pension
programme design has little impact on male participation rates.12 So I focus
on female activity rates. Table 2 provides three figures for each year and age
group: the actual activity rate from ILO data, the prediction from the baseline
model in Disney (2004) for the Irish data, and the predicted values were we to
assign to Ireland the average values of the public pension programme
parameters for these OECD countries.
Table 2: Activity Rates (Labour Force participation) for Women Aged 20-59 Years
in Ireland, Actual and Predictions According to Public Pension Programme
Difference
Base Prediction on Between
Predictions Actual Prediction OECD Average Predictions
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (3)
Women’s Activity Rates (%)
Age: 20-24  1975 69.7 69.6 68.9 –0.7
20-24 1985 74.7 70.2 70.1 –0.1
20-24 1995 66.4 70.1 70.9 0.8
25-29 1975 75.0 56.7 57.2 0.5
25-29 1985 51.1 52.6 51.7 –0.9
25-29 1995 38.2 52.2 52.5 0.3
30-44 1975 21.2 22.5 22.6 0.1
30-44 1985 25.5 38.0 37.9 –0.1
30-44 1995 57.0 45.4 45.5 0.1
45-49 1975 22.0 19.4 19.3 –0.1
45-49 1985 35.6 31.7 31.5 –0.2
45-49 1995 43.1 40.2 40.5 0.3
50-54 1975 22.7 20.2 20.0 –0.2
50-54 1985 24.6 27.2 27.0 –0.2
50-54 1995 35.3 35.2 35.5 0.3
55-59 1975 22.4 19.1 19.5 0.4
55-59 1985 21.3 22.5 22.3 –0.2
55-59 1995 26.6 28.3 28.3 0
Looking at the difference between the actual measured rates and the base
prediction, the model tracks closely the 20-24, 45-49 and 50-54 year age
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12This is at first sight surprising for older men. No doubt the existence of a public pension
programme has an impact on labour force participation of older workers, insofar as, in the absence
of a public programme, access to capital markets and the capacity to exploit the capital market
differs across households according to their lifetime earnings. So the public pension programme is
likely to affect who retires when and, perhaps thereby, the aggregate participation rate at any
given age. groups. It underpredicts the decline in economic activity rates among 25-29
year olds and the increase in participation among 30-44 year olds. To a lesser
extent, it also predicts faster growth of economic activity rates among 55-59
year old women. Column (3) then simulates these economic activity rates were
the Irish pension programme to have the characteristics of the average
programme among the OECD countries in the sample. Again, there are not
large differences, especially among the older age groups. Again, this is because
the simulated OECD programme differs from the Irish programme in two
competing directions – it is more generous, which raises the absolute tax
wedge, but it is also less targeted, which lowers the ‘tax component’of the Irish
public pension programme. Or, to turn the argument on its head, Ireland has
benefited in terms of the growth in economic activity rates in recent years from
the low cost of its social welfare programme and the lower value of the OECD-
measured ‘tax wedge’. But, in this analysis, the benefit is largely offset by the
‘Beveridge-type’ design of the programme, which has raised the ‘tax
component’ of that wedge.
4.3 Pension Reform in Ireland
This essay is not primarily about the direction of Irish pension reform.
Indeed one of the results of the analysis in the previous sub-section is that the
evolution of the public pension programme may not matter too much for
macroeconomic activity, especially for household saving rates. This is an
important point, especially where (as in the United States) it is often assumed,
wrongly, that a drastic retrenchment of the (essentially Beveridge-style) 
social security programme would substantially boost private retirement
saving (for the relevant calculations, see Disney (2005)). Of course, getting
microincentives right, such as the incentives within the retirement regime and
the tax treatment of retirement saving, is important for both macroeconomic
activity and for the public finances, but this is not a central issue in the
present analysis.
The central issues in the Irish case would appear to be: to maintain the
generosity of the Irish public pension programme as a percentage of real
earnings, essentially by indexing the benefit to earnings; to attempt to boost
second pillar coverage by both DB and DC plans; and to prepare for
demographic ageing by a degree of pre-funding of the public programme.
These elements are consistent, and macroeconomic stability can be
maintained in the face of demographic ageing, so long as all the elements of
the ‘package’ are implemented. The danger would be, for example, if the
accumulated funds of the Reserve Fund were used to boost significantly the
generosity of public pension benefits in the future rather than to prepare for
the likelihood of a future fall in the support ratio. Earnings indexation of
DESIGN OF PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMMES 191retirement benefits maintains the standard of living of pensioners in line with
workers, but becomes more costly once the ratio of workers to pensioners
declines. In the terminology of this essay, an overly generous public
programme allied to a high tax component in the future might raise the
possibility of adverse effects on employment and on labour market activity.
However, further discussion of these risks lays out the scope of what has been
presented here.
V CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this paper has been on an issue that has been of central
concern to Brendan Walsh – the link between the labour market and
macroeconomic performance, and how this interaction has evolved in Ireland
(as in Honohan and Walsh, 2002, and Walsh, 2004). The Irish combination of
social partnership and a Beveridge-style welfare state is unusual in OECD
experience (perhaps Denmark may come closest in this combination) and is
one potential reason for the Irish success story since the 1980s.
In this essay, I have argued that the design of the social welfare system –
in particular of the public pension programme – is an element of the story that
has not been drawn out fully in either the OECD-led literature or in the Irish
‘story’ told by Brendan and others. The design of the public pension
programme in Ireland has potential effects for macroeconomic performance –
for household saving rates, for economic activity and for employment. I
illustrated how indicators could be constructed, and an empirical test
implemented, to show how the design of the public pension (social security)
programme might affect economic activity.
As it happens the design of the Irish public pension programme, relative
to an ‘average’ OECD public programme, has design features which
approximately ‘cancel out’ in their aggregate effects. I illustrated this by
simulating a ‘what if’ scenario by which we transformed the Irish pension
programme into the OECD’s average programme. This result arises because
the Irish public pension programme is low cost but, being highly targeted, is
primarily a tax-and-transfer programme rather than a retirement saving
programme. This result need not hold for other countries: it is almost certainly
true that highly generous public pension programmes with strong actuarial-
based features have crowded out private saving – especially private
retirement saving – in other OECD countries (Disney, 2000b) although explicit
cross-country calculations of the type described here have not been done
elsewhere, to my knowledge. The results that suggest that programme design
features (abstracting from explicit retirement incentives) affect employment
192 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWrates, especially among older workers, as in Disney (2004), seem rather
weaker. Since, as argued here, features that affect private saving rates
adversely are most likely to affect employment rates positively, and vice versa,
the relative size of these effects, therefore, might suggest that countries focus
on the saving offsets rather than adverse employment effects in designing
public pension programmes. Beveridge-type programmes that minimise
saving offsets, such as Ireland’s programme, might therefore seem more
attractive. But this conclusion is only justified if, in social welfare terms, we
give equal weight to programme impacts on saving rates and on employment.
Finally, even if the design of the Irish public pension programme currently
seems to minimise adverse effects on saving and employment rates, there are
nevertheless implications for future developments of the programme.
Although low cost at present, the earnings-indexation of retirement benefits
obviously puts pressure on the public finances as the worker-pensioner
support ratio starts to decline. If continued economic success results in labour
market tightening and a higher ‘price’ in terms of welfare generosity being
exacted for social co-operation, pressures on the public finances and,
ultimately, on economic performance could yet arise. In which case, the
relatively high ‘tax component’ of the Irish programme, although mitigating
the potential adverse impact on private saving rates, may yet slow the Irish
hare. 
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Selected Regressions of Determinants of Age-Activity Rates and Household
Saving 
Dep. Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coeff. (Std. Err) LFP: LFP: LFP: Household Household
Women Women Men Saving Saving
50-54 55-59 50-54 Rate Rate
Pension tax –1.34*** –0.35 0.20 0.57*** 0.68***
(0.37) (0.30) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
Pension RR –0.20*** –0.17*** –0.14*** – –
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) –
IRR at 65 0.91** 0.89** –0.54** – –1.11***
(0.36) (0.29) (0.17) – (0.20)
IRR – – – –1.09*** –
(0.24)
Support ratio – – – 7.27*** 8.49***
(1.00) (1.01)
Retirement test index 5.07***  4.59***  2.29***  –0.79 –0.34
(1.97) (1.60) (0.91) (0.92) (1.00)
Earliest state pension age 0.19 –0.01 0.53*** –0.20 –0.26
(0.38) (0.30) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
Demand shock 0.19 0.10 0.17*** 0.13* 0.08
(0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
GDP growth (%) – – – – 0.35
(0.23)
Max. LTV ratio – – – – 6.38**
(2.87)
Financial credit as % GDP – – – – 1.63
(1.30)
Union density –0.07 –0.06 0.07 – –
(0.11) (0.09) (0.05) –
Employment protection 
index –2.06 –1.31 3.73*** – –
(2.00) (1.63) (0.93) – –
1980s 8.89*** 4.44*** –1.42*** –3.77*** –4.69***
(1.06) (0.87) (0.49) (0.58) (0.56)
1990s 19.00*** 11.76*** –1.01** –3.55*** –4.23***
(1.14) (0.92) (0.53) (0.47) (0.57)
Log L –135.40 –122.40 –86.94 –93.14 –85.43
Wald χ2 (28/30/31) 2,360.0 3,141.6 1113.6 1,511.4 1,947.8
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: Estimated by generalised least squares, weighted by civilian employment; country
dummies included; standard errors in parentheses. ***=1 per cent, **=5 per cent, *=10 per
cent significance. N=63 (21 countries in 1975, 1985, 1995). 
Source: Disney (2005).
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